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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Second Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Johnson contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his 
second successive post-conviction petition. (See generally Appellant's brief; 
Reply Brief.) In his Appellant's brief, Johnson argued that egregious deficiency of 
his initial post-conviction petition counsel constituted "sufficient reason" pursuant 
to I.C. § 19-4908 to justify the filing of a second successive petition. After the 
Idaho Court of Appeals subsequently undermined this argument in Lopez v. 
State, 157 Idaho 795, 339 P.3d 1199 (Ct. App. 2014), Johnson argued in his 
Reply brief that his second successive petition was justified by the efforts he 
made to attempt to mitigate his counsel's deficient performance. (See generally 
Reply brief.) The Idaho Court of Appeals permitted the state to file this brief in 
response. 1 (2/9/15 Order.) Despite Johnson's attempts to re-characterize his 
argument, he has still failed to distinguish Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 
P.3d 365 (2014). 
1 Johnson filed a motion to augment his Appellant's brief with new arguments 
made in his Reply brief regarding the Idaho Court of Appeals' recent opinions in 
Lopez and Parvin v. State, 157 Idaho 518, _, 337 P.3d 677, 681 (Ct. App. 
2014). (2/4/15 "Motion to Augment Appellant's Brief.") The Idaho Court of 
Appeals granted the motion with respect to "all arguments set forth in Appellant's 
reply brief," and permitted the state to file a brief in response. (2/9/15 Order.) 
1 
B. Johnson's Argument On Appeal Is Precluded By Murphy v. State 
In Murphy v. State, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled prior precedent 
and held that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel cannot constitute 
"sufficient reason" for filing a successive petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. 
Murphy, 156 Idaho at 392-395, 327 P.3d at 368-371. The Court recognized that 
because, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, there is no 
constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings, a 
petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such 
proceedings, even as a means of attempting to overcome state procedural 
hurdles. kt 
In this case, Johnson attempted to distinguish Murphy by arguing that it 
does not apply where a post-conviction petitioner demonstrates particularly 
egregious counsel ineffectiveness that goes "beyond simple ineffective 
assistance of counsel." (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) However, in the interim 
between the filing of Johnson's Appellant's brief and the state's Respondent's 
brief, the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected a nearly identical argument in Lopez v. 
State, 157 Idaho at_, 339 P.3d at 1201-1202. In its Respondent's brief, the 
state argued that Lopez precluded Johnson's attempt to distinguish Murphy. 
(Respondent's brief, pp.10-11.) 
In his Reply Brief, Johnson attempted to distinguish Lopez and Murphy by 
arguing that his second successive post-conviction petition was justified by the 
efforts he made to attempt to mitigate his initial successive petition counsel's 
ineffectiveness. (See generally Reply brief.) More specifically, Johnson 
2 
contends that the "focus" of his justification for the filing of the second successive 
petition "is on [his own] efforts, not his attorney's performance." (Reply brief, 
p.1.) Johnson argues that when he realized his initial successive post-conviction 
counsel was failing to adequately argue that his petition was timely, he filed 
numerous pro se motions in an effort to mitigate this alleged deficient 
performance, including a "Motion to Withdraw Counsel" and a "Motion to Conduct 
Discovery." (Reply brief, pp.2-3.) The district court apparently did not rule on 
these motions prior to summarily dismissing Johnson's petition. See Idaho Data 
Repository, Gooding County Case No. CV-2009-00399; R., Vol. I, pp.192-215, 
226.) Johnson contends that "[e]quity demands that such personal attempts to 
correct counsel's actions before the action is dismissed and which are ignored by 
the district court be deemed sufficient to present the claims in a successive 
action."2 (Reply brief, pp.2-3.) 
Johnson has failed to distinguish Murphy or Lopez. Despite his attempt to 
re-characterize his proposed justification for filing a second successive petition, 
Johnson's argument is still, at its core, that ineffective assistance of his initial 
post-conviction counsel constitutes "sufficient reason" to justify a second 
successive petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. Johnson's argument that he tried 
2 While the Idaho Data Repository indicates that these motions were filed on 
December 23, 2009, the motions themselves do not appear to be included in the 
appellate record. In his reply brief, Johnson cites to the Data Repository when 
referencing these motions. (See Reply brief, p.2.) Thus, it is impossible to 
analyze the effort Johnson actually made to mitigate any alleged deficiency of 
counsel, or even to confirm that these motions were what the Data Repository 
purported them to be. Missing portions of the record must be presumed to 
support the action of the district court. State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 
P.2d 333, 334 (1996). 
3 
to bring his counsel's deficient performance to the attention of his counsel and 
the district court does not change the character of this proposed justification. 
Neither the language of Murphy, nor the language of the cases which have 
interpreted Murphy, is so narrow as to exclude instances where a post-conviction 
petitioner demonstrates his efforts to mitigate the alleged deficiency. See 
Murphy, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365; Lopez, 157 Idaho 795, 339 P.3d 1199; 
Parvin, 157 Idaho 518, 337 P.3d 677, 681. Indeed, such a limitation on the 
holding of Murphy would largely abrogate it. It is common for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to include, as evidence of counsel's deficiency, 
allegations regarding what steps a petitioner took in his unsuccessful attempts to 
encourage counsel to take some action. Such allegations do not transform an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim to a different type of claim outside of the 
purview of Murphy. Johnson has therefore failed to distinguish Murphy, and 
failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
second successive petition. 
Johnson's Reply Brief may also be construed as arguing that the district 
court erred by failing to rule on his prose motions filed in the course of the initial 
successive post-conviction proceeding, and that this error constitutes "sufficient 
reason" to file another successive petition. (See Reply Brief, pp.1-4.) However 
this assertion, even if true, does not form a basis for justifying a successive 
petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. Idaho Code§ 19-4908 permits a petitioner to 
file a successive petition when there is "sufficient reason" to justify a new ground 
or claim. It does not permit a petitioner to utilize a successive petition as a 
4 
mechanism to correct alleged procedural errors made by the district court in a 
prior post-conviction proceeding.3 
The Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Murphy precludes the argument on 
which Johnson's appeal relies - that ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel can constitute sufficient reason to justify the filing of a successive 
petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. Johnson therefore cannot show that the 
district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. 
C. In The Alternative, Even Notwithstanding Murphy, Johnson's Assertion 
That His Initial Successive Petition Was Timely Is Barred By The Doctrine 
of Res Judicata 
The district court summarily dismissed Johnson's initial successive petition 
both on its merits, and on the ground that it was untimely. (R. Vol. I, pp.192-
215.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the summary dismissal solely on the 
timeliness ground. Johnson v. State, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 574, Docket 
No. 37378 (Idaho App., August 8, 2011 ). In conjunction with the filing of his 
second successive post-conviction petition, Johnson submitted additional 
affidavits, evidence, and arguments regarding his efforts to timely file the first 
successive petition. (R., Vol. I, pp.5-163, 166.) After providing notice, the district 
court summarily dismissed the petition, correctly concluding that Johnson's 
timeliness argument was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and that in any 
3 Similarly, and as the state previously argued (Respondent's brief, pp.12-13), no 
application of Murphy is necessary in this case because while I.C. § 19-4908 
permits a petitioner to file a successive petition where there is "sufficient reason" 
to justify a new ground or claim, it does not permit a petitioner to re-litigate prior 
determinations, such as the ones made in this case by the district court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, that his initial successive petition was untimely. 
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event, Johnson's initial successive petition was untimely even in light of the 
additional argument and evidence. (R., Vol. I, pp.164-181; Vol. II, pp.283-298.) 
Johnson has failed to show that the district court erred as to either of these 
determinations. 
1. The Doctrine Of Res Judicata Precludes Johnson's Timeliness 
Argument 
In his Reply brief, Johnson asserts that the district court erred by 
concluding that his timeliness argument is precluded by the res judicata doctrine. 
(Reply brief, pp.6-7.) Specifically, Johnson asserts: "The question now before 
the Court is whether the additional information, which Mr. Johnson was 
prevented from presenting due to the district court's failure to acknowledge his 
pro se motions to excuse his counsel, establishes that Mr. Johnson filed within a 
reasonable time. This issue was not addressed in the prior proceedings and its 
consideration is not precluded by res judicata or the law of the case." (Reply 
brief, p.7.) 
Johnson's contention fails because he has not cited authority to support 
his apparent proposition that an individual can avoid res judicata issue preclusion 
simply by presenting new arguments based on previously known evidence, or by 
asserting that previous attempts to pursue the issue were thwarted by ineffective 
assistance of counsel or court error. Under Johnson's interpretation of the res 
judicata doctrine, no Idaho appellate decision would be safe from continuous 
attacks in the district court, supported by new arguments and second-guessing of 
prior attorney performance. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
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court's determination that Johnson's initial successive petition was untimely. 
Johnson may not re-litigate this issue. 
2. Johnson's Initial Successive Petition Was Untimely 
A post-conviction proceeding must be commenced by filing a petition "any 
time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the 
determination of an appeal or from the determination of proceedings following an 
appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-4902(a). In the case of successive 
petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid application of I.C. § 
19-4902 would preclude courts from considering 'claims which simply are not 
known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise important due process 
issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009) 
(quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)). 
Thus, previously unknown claims are not time-barred if brought within a 
reasonable time of when they were known or should have been known. 
Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070. Moreover, the timeliness of a 
petition is measured "from the date of notice, not from the date a petitioner 
assembles a complete cache of evidence." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 
P.3d at 875. Absent a showing by the petitioner that the limitation period should 
be tolled, the failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for 
dismissal of the petition. Rhoades, 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066; Evensiosky v. 
State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 190, 
219 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009). 
7 
In this case, even if neither Murphy, I.C. § 19-4908, or the res judicata 
doctrine precludes Johnson's argument on appeal, he has still failed to show that 
the district court erred in concluding that his initial successive petition was 
untimely, even in light of his new arguments and newly submitted evidence. 
In his Reply brief, Johnson contends that the district court failed to 
properly apply the Charboneau "reasonable time" standard for successive 
petitions, and instead incorrectly applied the 42-day standard utilized to evaluate 
the timeliness of successive petitions filed in capital cases. (Appellant's brief, p.5 
(citing Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642, 649 (2008)). 
However, a review of the record reveals that while the district court cited Pizzuto 
and referenced the 42-day capital case successive petition standard, it did not 
directly apply it, and instead recognized and utilized the Charboneau "reasonable 
time" standard. 
In both its notice of intent to dismiss Johnson's successive petition and its 
memorandum dismissal order, the district court cited the applicable Charboneau 
standard and specifically recognized that "[t]he evaluation of timeliness [of a 
successive] petition has always been on a case by case basis," and that such an 
evaluation includes an analysis of "the reasonable time necessary to prepare and 
file a petition for post-conviction relief," the mental capacity of the petitioner, and 
the petitioner's familiarity with the post-conviction proceeding process. (R., Vol. I, 
p.175.) The court then engaged in a thorough analysis of Johnson's arguments 
regarding the timeliness of his petition, and of the efforts Johnson made to 
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pursue possible remedies upon receiving notice of the basis for his new post-
conviction claim. (R., Vol. I, pp.164-181; Vol. II, pp.288-295.) 
No such analysis would be necessary had the court directly applied the 
42-day Pizzuto standard from the date on which Johnson received notice of the 
basis for the new claim. Instead, the analysis demonstrates that the district court 
considered the timeliness issue in the "case-by-case" manner contemplated by 
Charboneau, according to the specific facts of this case. The court then 
continued, "[i]f forty-two days is a reasonable time to file a successive petition in 
a capital case there is no reason to believe that such a time period would not be 
reasonable in a non-capital case." (R., Vol. II, p.296.) Johnson has failed to 
show that the district court's reference to the 42-day Pizzuto standard as a mere 
guideline constitutes an incorrect application of the Charboneau "reasonable 
time" standard. This is particularly true where, as in this case, the actual time 
between the notice of the basis of the claim and the filing of the petition - four 
months - significantly exceeds 42 days. Johnson has therefore failed to show 
that the district court erred.4 
Even if neither Murphy nor I.C. § 19-4908 precluded Johnson's asserted 
justification for the filing of a second successive post-conviction petition, Johnson 
has failed to show that the district court erred either by concluding that Johnson's 
timeliness argument was barred by the res judicata doctrine, or by concluding 
4 The state also asserts that Johnson has failed to demonstrate that the district 
court erred in concluding that four months exceeded the Charboneau 
"reasonable time" standard in which to file a successive petition under the 
specific circumstances of this case. For this proposition, the state adopts the 
district court's rationale, as stated in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss and 
Memorandum Decision. (R., Vol. I, pp.164-181, Vol. II, pp.283-298.) 
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that Johnson's initial successive petition was not filed within a reasonable time of 
Johnson receiving notice of the factual basis for the claim. Johnson has 
therefore failed to show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's 
summary dismissal of Johnson's second successive petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
DATED this 20th day of March 2015 
~ c~ 
MARKW. OLSO 
Deputy Attorney General 
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